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Abstract In this paper we provide a brief recount of 
alternative approaches to what we argue is a fundamental issue 
for our understanding of sociality – the micro-macro problem or, 
as we refer to it here, the problem of social emergence. We then 
discuss recent attempts to identify how the range and type of 
emergent phenomena changes as a result of changes in the 
fundamental characteristics of micro-agents. We conclude that 
there appear to be a number of critical thresholds, notably that 
which arises when agents become constitutively autonomous and 
subsequently also develop behavioural (sensori-motor) 
autonomy.  It is the combination of these two levels of autonomy 
which accounts for what we typically call ‘cognition’ in 
biological agents. Current artificial intelligence models attempt 
to replicate the ability without autonomy. While this approach is 
being seen as increasingly problematic in robotics it appears yet 
to have influenced approaches to social simulation.  We propose 
achieving behavioural autonomy as a goal and focal point for 
future simulation research. We argue that this is the minimum 
threshold needed to achieve social emergence.  We illustrate this 
by discussing the concept of social ‘norm’ as an ‘attractor’ in a 
phenomenal domain of structurally coupled behaviour..12 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Building and working with artificial societies using the 
methods of multi-agent social simulation serves us in several 
ways – it allows us to operationalize social theories and to 
compare simulated behaviours with those observed in the real 
world and it allows us to build new theory by exploring the 
minimal mechanisms that might explain observed social 
behaviour. Most importantly, it provides a unique ability to 
explore the interplay between levels of phenomena and to 
understand dynamic properties of systems. A great deal can and 
has been achieved in both these areas with even the simple 
methods we currently have available. However, Keith Sawyer 
[1] has recently reminded us that, to date, we have worked with 
agents of very limited cognitive capability and that this 
necessarily limits the range and type of behaviour which can be 
                                                                
1 Centre for Research in Social Simulation, Department of Sociology, 
University of Surrey, Guildford, GU1 7XH, UK, 
c.goldspink@surrey.ac.uk 
2  Executive Director and co-founder of Incept Labs, Sydney, Australia,  
rkay@inceptlabs.com.au 
explored. This echoes a sentiment made a decade ago by 
Christiano Castelfranchi [2] that social simulation is not really 
social until it can provide an adequate account of the implication 
of the feedback between macro and micro which becomes 
possible with higher cognitive functioning of social agents.   
This paper examines the relationship between agent capability 
and orders of emergence in order better to define the critical 
thresholds which limit our capacity to simulate certain classes of 
social phenomena.  
In many respects, developments in our capacity to simulate 
artificial societies have led us to confront anew a long-standing 
issue within social theory. This problem is variously referred to 
as the micro-macro problem, the problem of structure and 
agency or social emergence.  This problem has been a long term 
focus of our collaboration [see 3, 4]. Over the past decade we 
have worked towards a theory of sociality which can provide a 
coherent and consistent account of the interpenetration (circular 
causality) of micro and macro phenomena – i.e. which can 
provide a substantive account of fundamental social generative 
mechanisms. No such theory currently exists. This current paper 
is a continuation of that work but also has its origin in one 
author’s involvement with the EU funded project titled 
Emergence in the Loop (EMIL). Through EMIL we aim to a) 
provide a theoretical account of the mechanisms of normative 
self-regulation in a number of computer mediated communities 
b) specify the minimum cognitive processes agents require to 
behave in normative ways c) develop a simulator which can 
replicate the range and type of normative behaviour identified by 
the empirical research so as to further deepen our understanding 
of how and under what conditions normative self-regulation is 
possible.  
2 A BRIEF RECOUNT OF THE PROBLEM  
The notion of emergence has a long history. Unfortunately the 
concept remains ill defined ambiguous and contentious, leading 
to the criticism that it stands as little more than a covering 
concept – used when no adequate account or explanation exists 
for some unexpected phenomena. The origin of the concept has 
been attributed to George Henry Lewes, in 1875 [5]. It 
subsequently found wide adoption within the philosophy of 
science but has been advanced within four streams: philosophy, 
particularly of science and mind; systems theory, in particular 
 complex systems; social science where it has largely been 
referred to under the heading of the micro-macro link and/or the 
problem of structure and agency; and more recently in 
theoretical biology, cognitive theory and robotics. Interestingly 
there has been relatively little cross influence between these 
streams.  
The Contribution from Philosophy of 
science 
The philosophy of science and philosophy of mind stream is 
arguably the oldest – some date it back to Plato [6] but the 
debate is widely seen as having come to focus with the British 
Emergentists [7-9]. This school sought to deal with the apparent 
qualitatively distinct properties associated with different 
phenomena (physical, chemical, biological, mental) in the 
context of the debate between mechanism and vitalism. This 
stream remains focused on explaining different properties of 
classes of natural phenomena and with the relationship between 
brains and minds [See 10 for a recent summary of the positions]. 
As a consequence this has been the dominant stream within 
artificial intelligence. Peterson [6: 695] summarizes the widely 
agreed characteristics of emergent phenomena within this stream 
as follows.  Emergent entities: 
1. Are characterized by higher-order descriptions (i.e. form a 
hierarchy). 
2. Obey higher order laws. 
3. Are characterized by unpredictable novelty. 
4. Are composed of lower level entities, but lower level 
entities are insufficient to fully account for emergent 
entities (irreducibility). 
5. May be capable of top-down causation. 
6. Are characterized by multiple realization or wild 
disjunction [11] (alternative micro-states may generate the 
same macro states).  
Within this stream there is a concern with both upward and 
downward causation and it is the possibility for the later which 
attracts most argument. A key concept is  supervenience: a 
specification of the ‘loose’ determinism held to apply between 
levels such that ‘…an entity cannot change at a higher level 
without also changing at a lower level’  [12: 556]. Advocates of 
supervenience argue that properties associated by emergent 
structures exist only due to the properties of the underlying 
constituents and, in having no unique causal power other than 
those derived from those constituents, comprise only 
epiphenomena – they are not ‘real’.  This controversy persists 
within philosophical circles although it appears to derive in large 
part from an extreme form of physicalism [13].  Practicing 
physicists appear to have fewer problems with the concept than 
philosophers of mind. Physicists Clayton and Davies [10], for 
example,  specify downward causation as involving macro 
structures placing constraint on lower level processes hence 
‘Emergent entities provide the context in which local, bottom up 
causation takes place and is made possible’ [6: 697]. Davies 
[14] argues that the mechanism of downward causation can 
usefully be considered in terms of boundaries. Novelty, he 
argues, may have its origin in a system being ‘open’. He 
concludes: 
 … top-down talk refers not to vitalistic augmentation of 
known forces, but rather to the system harnessing existing 
forces for its own ends. The problem is to understand how 
this harnessing happens, not at the level of individual 
intermolecular interactions, but overall – as a coherent 
project. It appears that once a system is sufficiently 
complex, then new top down rules of causation emerge 
(Davies 2006: 48).  
For Davies then, top-down causation is associated with self-
organization and may undergo qualitative transitions with 
increasing system complexity. For Davies also it is the 
‘openness’ of some systems that ‘provides room’ for self-
organizing process to arise, but he concludes, ‘openness to the 
environment merely explains why there may be room for top-
down causation; it tells us nothing about how that causation 
works.’ The devil then, is in the detail of the mechanisms 
specific to particular processes in particular contexts and 
particular phenomenal domains. Perhaps part of the problem 
with the concept is that it has been approached at too abstract a 
level.  
The Contribution from Social Science 
The micro-macro problem – the relationship between the 
actions of individuals and resulting social structures and the 
reciprocal constraint those structures place on individual agency 
– has long standing in social science. The problem is central to 
many social theories developed throughout the 19th and 20th 
century. Examples include: Marxian dialectical materialism [15] 
built upon by, among others, Vygotsky [16] and Lyont’ev [17];  
the social constructionism of Berger and Luckmann [18]; 
Gidden’s structuration theory [19]; and the recent work of 
critical realists [20-23]. These alternative theories are frequently 
founded on differing assumptions, extending from the essentially 
objectivist/rationalist theory of Coleman [24], through the 
critical theories of Habermas and then to the radical 
constructivism of Luhmann [25, 26].  
Fuchs & Hofkirchner [27: 33] have recently suggested a four 
category schema for classifying social theory according to the 
ontological position adopted with respect to the micro-macro 
relationship. The majority of existing social theories, they argue, 
fall into one or other of the categories: individualism and 
sociologism. Neither of these ‘paradigms’ provides a theoretical 
foundation which supports exploration let alone the possibility of 
advancing understanding of the interplay between agency and 
structure. The third category, dualism, while considering both 
aspects, maintains a dichotomous stance as necessary and again 
does not advance any understanding of the interplay. Only those 
theories categorized as dialectical therefore have relevance. 
Even here, it is reasonable to conclude that little practical 
advance has been achieved, as most positions result in a 
straddling of bottom up and top-down arguments and/or suffer 
from excessively vague conceptualisation. These theories 
quickly break down again into a dichotomy the moment an 
attempt is made to make them operational.  
What has been largely agreed, despite the very different 
theoretical and often inadequate handling of this problem, is that 
structure and agency come together in activity or in body-hood – 
the specific psycho-motor state at the instant of enaction. Both 
Vygotsky and Giddens, for example, focus on action as the point 
of intersection between human agency and social structures and 
it is implicit in Bourdieu’s habitus also.  
 The Contribution from Systems Theory 
Systems language was evident in the work of the early 
Emergentists and in sociology and anthropology which took 
seriously the structure/agency problem – notably that of 
Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson. However, ‘systems’ as a 
focus of research took form with Bertalanffy’s attempt to 
establish a General Systems Theory [28, 29]. As the science of 
‘wholes’ systems theory stands in contrast to reductionisms 
concern with parts: it was advanced as a counter to what was 
perceived as excessive reductionism dominating scientific 
discourse during much of the 20th century. 
Early (first order) cybernetic approaches modelled systems as 
‘black boxes’ effectively masking the relationship between 
micro and macro. Application of the concept to social science by 
Ernst von Glasersfeld and Heinz von Foerster [30] led to social 
(second order) cybernetics and soft systems approaches [31] 
more useful for describing the systemic behaviour of social 
systems. While the aspiration of the General Systems Movement 
to establish a general science of systems is widely regarded as 
having failed [32], systems approaches have contributed 
valuable methods for the study of the interplay between levels. 
The Systems view of emergence was founded on: 
 Holism; the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
 A concern with positive and negative feedback.  
 A concern with boundaries and boundary conditions – 
including as an epistemic act rather than an ontological 
fact.  
More recently the development of complex systems theory 
and its application to natural, social and cognitive phenomena 
has provided additional concepts upon which much current 
debate about emergence draws. Many of these concepts and 
methods have become  widely used within the multi-agent 
modelling community [33-36].  
In contrast to the position taken by the British Emergentists 
who argued that irreducibility was the exception [8], most real 
world systems are now argued to be non-linear [37-40] and 
hence irreducible. It is non-linearity which contributes to these 
system’s capacity for novelty and unpredictability through the  
presence of deterministic Chaos [41, 42] and/or equifinality. 
Equifinality refers to a system where a single high level property 
may be realized by more than one set of micro-states which have 
no lawful relationship between them [12, 43, 44]. As there is no 
a-priori basis by which the likely micro state can be determined, 
such systems are irreducible and unpredictable in principle.  
The Contribution of Theoretical Biology, 
Cognitive Science and Robotics 
While complexity science has drawn on a diverse range of 
research threads, one area where an interest in emergent 
phenomena has been strongly represented is in Artificial Life 
[45] (Alife). While initially involving exploration of emergence 
using very simple ‘cellular automata’, there has been increased 
interest within this community to explain the fundamental 
building blocks of life. In contrast to first generation Artificial 
Intelligence [46] this has included a commitment to a bottom up 
methodology – i.e. evolving cognitive capability rather than 
engineering it in [47]. This has led the field to a biologically 
grounded perspective of cognition and one very different from 
the symbolic representation approach adopted within first 
generation AI. From this perspective any social emergent 
structures will be constrained by the biological fundamentals of 
cognition. In other words, behavioural and linguistic domains 
will depend on and be constrained by the metabolic systems 
which give rise to them. This has bridged Alife research into 
theoretical biology, in particular, autopoietic theory [47-49] and 
hence enactive theories of cognition [50, 51].    
The enactive view of cognition was first proposed by the 
theoretical biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela 
[52, 53]. While these authors primary contribution has been 
towards understanding the self-organising metabolic 
mechanisms of life, the resulting theory of autopoietic systems 
provided a foundation for a general theory of cognition [54-56].  
This embodied/enactive view stands in stark contrast to the 
symbolic representation [57], rational actor and game theoretical 
approaches which have most commonly informed social 
simulation. It has however recently seen considerable application 
in robotics [66-69], where it is argued to be fundamental to 
understanding how robots can become genuinely autonomous – 
i.e. capable of learning about their environment without the need 
for detailed information being provided by a designer. Within 
social theory some consideration has been given to the 
implications of enaction for understanding and theorising social 
behaviour [26, 58-60] although not without some controversy 
[61-63] and we have argued elsewhere that many of these 
extensions are incompatible with the original concept [64, 65]. 
None of this has yet found extension into social simulation. 
Attempts to understand and specify mechanisms of social 
emergence have generally built upon the philosophical and 
systems theoretical literatures. There has been little 
accommodation of the wider debate about agency and structure 
particularly that associated with dialectical social theory. The 
micro level assumptions have been largely restricted to those 
associated with the rational actor and game theory and first 
generation AI. Very little work has been done to incorporate the 
perspective offered by recent developments in artificial life, 
robotics and theoretical biology. It is however this detailed work 
on the relationship between cognitive capability and associated 
emergent behaviour that arguably provides the most valuable 
contribution to our understanding of social emergence. This is in 
part due to it being grounded in the study of real biological 
entities and/or the practical challenges of building viable robots.  
3 ORDERS OF EMERGENCE 
A number of authors have identified what they refer to as 
orders of emergence. Gilbert, for example distinguishes between 
a first and second order. First order emergence includes macro 
structures which arise from local interactions between agents of 
limited cognitive range (particles, fluids, reflex action). By 
contrast, second order emergence is argued to arise ‘where 
agents recognise emergent phenomena, such as societies, clubs, 
formal organizations, institutions, localities and so on where the 
fact that you are a member or a non-member, changes the rules 
of interaction between you and other agents.’ [70]. This reflects 
high order cognition – in particular a capacity to distinguish 
class characteristics, assess ‘self’ for conformity and to change 
behaviour accordingly. First and second order emergence then 
each imply qualitatively distinct cognitive mechanisms and 
 suggest a continuum of orders of emergence linked to cognitive 
capability.  
In a similar vein, Castelfranchi [2: 27] has distinguished 
‘cognitive emergence’ which: ‘… occurs where agents become 
aware, through a given ‘conceptualization’ of a certain 
‘objective’ pre-cognitive (unknown and non deliberated) 
phenomenon that is influencing their results and outcomes, and 
then, indirectly, their actions.’ This approach is based on a first 
generation AI [46] approach to conceptualizing agents – agent 
cognition is assumed to involve acting on beliefs desires and 
intentions (BDI). Thus Castelfranchi conceives of a feedback 
path from macro pattern to micro behaviour in much the same 
way as Gilbert, except that here a cognitive mechanism is 
specified. Castelfranchi argues that this mechanism 
‘characterises the theory of social dynamics’ and gives rise to a 
distinct class of emergent phenomena. In this account, the 
representations agents have about the beliefs, desires and 
intentions of other agents plays a causal role in their subsequent 
behaviour and therefore shapes the structures they participate in 
generating. Castelfranchi argues that understanding this process 
is fundamental to social simulation: it is where social simulation 
can make its greatest contribution.  
These ideas are more comprehensively reflected in the five 
orders of emergence suggested by Ellis  [71:99-101].  
 
Order Ellis’ Description of Properties Characteristic 
Organization3 
1 Bottom up leading to higher level 
generic properties (examples include 
the properties of gases, liquids and 
solids) 
Property emergence 
2 Bottom up action plus boundary 
conditions lead to higher level 
structures (e.g. convection cells, sand 
piles, cellular automata)  
Self-organization 
Far-from- 
Equilibrium (weak- 
autonomy) 
3 Bottom up action leading to feedback 
and control at various levels leading to 
meaningful top down action - 
teleonomy (e.g. living cells, multi-
cellular organisms with ‘instinctive’ – 
phylogenetically determined reactive 
capability) 
Self-production 
(autopoiesis) of 
metabolism (strong 
autonomy) 
 
 
Autonomous 
sensori-motor loops 
(strong autonomy) 
 
4 as per 3 but with the addition of 
explicit goals related to memory 
influence by specific events in the 
individual history (i.e. capable of 
learning) 
5 In addition to 4 some goals are 
explicitly expressed in language 
(humans). 
Semiotic autonomy 
(strong autonomy) 
Table one: Adapted from Ellis.  
In table one we set out Ellis’ order number in column one and 
his description of the associated characteristics in column two. In 
column three we suggest an alternative classification which 
draws on the distinctions suggested by Rocha.  
As with the approach of Gilbert and Castelfranchi, Ellis’s 
framework also suggests that the range and type of emergence 
possible depends fundamentally on the range and class of 
behaviour agents are able to generate. 
                                                                
3 Classification according to the work of  [72. Rocha, L.M., Language 
Theory: Consensual Selection of Dynamics. Cybernetics and Systems, 
1996. 27(6): p. 541-553.] 
Considering category one emergence: particles have fixed 
properties and are able to enter into a limited range of 
interactions with others based on those properties. Swarms of 
particles can nevertheless demonstrate some rudimentary self-
organisation and hence emergence [45]. Physics has furnished 
good accounts of many specific examples [73] but they have 
limited implication for our understanding of social behaviour.  
Category two has also been well explored – it is the focus of a 
great deal of the work undertaken on complex, far from 
equilibrium systems [74, 75]. Examples include the work of Per 
Bak [76] on sand piles and earthquakes and Lorenz [42] on 
weather systems. Many so called social simulations which 
incorporate agents which have fixed behaviours and no capacity 
for learning also arguably belong here. These include classic 
simulations such as Schellings segregation model, the 
cooperation models of Axelrod [77] or the Sugarscape models of 
Epstein and Axtell [78]. Some may argue that these models 
involve agents with goals and therefore represent examples of 
fourth order emergence. The transition between third order and 
fourth, as will be argued below, involves a move to agent 
autonomy that is missing in these models – their goals are 
designed in and not a result of their own operation – it is for this 
reason that we argue they belong to order two although some 
may argue they represent reasonable analogues of the type of 
behaviour that might be generated by agents with higher order 
capability.  
It is significant that Ellis’ provides primarily biological 
examples for his category three order of emergence. The 
paradigmatic biological entity which illustrates the processes of 
reciprocal micro-macro causality pointed to by Ellis and for 
which we have an excellent description which has been made 
operational in vitro and in silico [see for example 79, 80] is the 
cell. While the mechanisms of autocatalysis and the metabolic 
pathways of cell self-production are well documented and 
closely studied, the most concise articulation of the fundamental 
self-producing processes involved comes in the theory of 
autopoiesis already mentioned [52, 53, 80, 81]. Varela [82: 78] 
states: Autopoiesis is a prime example of a …dialectics between 
the local component levels and the global whole, linked together 
in reciprocal relation through the requirement of constitution of 
an entity that self-separates from its background. In other words 
the distinguishing characteristic in this order is that the micro-
macro interplay leads to an autonomous structure which acts so 
as to maintain its viability as an entity. This is not the case for 
many far from equilibrium systems such as weather systems. 
The maintenance of viability is a clear threshold and one we 
appear far from being able to simulate using existing methods.  
In his third order category Ellis includes a range of capabilities 
of biological entities up to and including ‘instinctive’ action. 
These suggest that single and multi-cellular organisms including 
those with a central nervous system would all be included. It 
may be that this order is too broadly cast. Ellis has grouped 
entities such as cells which rely exclusively on metabolic self-
regulation with entities which also have a capacity to self-
regulate using sensorimotor mechanisms. Differentiated 
aggregates of cells display greater capacity to respond to their 
environment, even where they do not possess a central nervous 
system, than do individual cells (e.g. by development of an 
immune response). A central nervous system provides the entity 
with even greater behavioural plasticity [52] and hence a 
capacity to maintain its viability in a wider range of 
 environments. As a consequence each threshold probably 
originates a distinct macro phenomenology different from that of 
the cells that constitute them [53].  
The primary point of distinction between order three and order 
four would appear to be between (phylogenetically) fixed 
individual characteristics and a capacity for an individual agent 
to learn. This category covers animals up to human but this again 
is a big span covering a number of cognitive and developmental 
thresholds, including the emergence of pre-linguistic theory of 
mind, and self-awareness [83] which might be expected to have 
a significant effect on social emergence. It is also not clear what 
is meant by learning.  Learning can span a wide range of 
capabilities from simple operant conditioning to advanced 
reasoning. 
The final transition between order four and five demarcates 
the line between non-human animals and humans. The advent of 
language gives rise to a distinct phenomenal domain with 
significant implications for social emergence. This is not least 
due to the association language has in humans with other 
cognitive capabilities such as theory of mind, narrative ability 
and reflexivity. 
Examining the characteristic organization implied in Ellis’ 
orders of emergence shows that the transition points are strongly 
linked to processes of self-organisation and autonomous closure. 
Furthermore this autonomous closure occurs recursively: closure 
at one level makes possible closure at a higher level and so on. 
What we are essentially attempting to do in social simulation at 
present is to shortcut this process: to achieve reasonable 
analogues of behaviour at various levels without also modelling 
the processes upon which it depends. This appears reasonable – 
we do not need to model sub-atomic processes in order to work 
with models of molecules and understand the reaction chains 
they can participate in, so why would we need to model 
metabolic or sensorimotor systems in order to understand social 
interactions?  How then do we advance our understanding of the 
effect of different cognitive capability on orders of emergence 
and if and when they matter?  
4 AGENT AUTONOMY 
Robots are generally intended to be able to perform useful 
functions in real and complex environments. To do so they need 
to have a level of autonomy: a capacity to map their worlds and 
to decide what is important and change their behaviour 
accordingly. This proved computationally difficult (if not 
impossible) to achieve using conventional AI approaches. A 
breakthrough was achieved with Brooks demonstration of the 
power of situated cognition [84]. It is therefore no surprise that 
our understanding of the implications and opportunities 
presented by understanding cognitive autonomy has been led by 
the field of robotics. What then is the state of the art and what 
implications may it have for understanding and simulating social 
emergence? 
In her introductory paper for the Modelling Autonomy 
Workshop held in San Sebastián in March 2007 
(http://www.ehu.es/ias-research/autonomy/), Margaret Boden 
stated that ‘very broadly speaking, autonomy is self-
determination: the ability to do what one does independently, 
without being forced so to do by some outside power.’ She notes 
that the concept is problematic as there are various types and 
degrees of independence. This has already been illustrated above 
when examining Ellis’ orders of cognition. In social simulation 
we have achieved limited independence in the form of self-
organization. For Barandiaran & Moreno [85: 179], ‘The main 
difference between self-organization and autonomy is that while 
self-organization appears when the (microscopic) activity of a 
system generates at least a single (macroscopic) constraint, 
autonomy implies an open process of self-determination where 
an increasing number of constraints are self-generated.’ This 
reemphasises that autonomy involves recursion: cyclic 
generation proceeding from simple self-organisation to closure 
in a succession of phenomenal domains culminating in closure at 
the semiotic level.  
Within Alife and robotics, it has been increasingly argued that 
while autopoiesis specifies the metabolic closure and self-
production characteristic of living entities, cognition implies 
more than this. A cognitive agent has a primary autonomous 
metabolic loop which serves to maintain its biological viability 
and (at least) one other loop which links sensory surfaces with 
motor surfaces [see also 49]. This second loop affords the agent 
significant additional plasticity. This plasticity is realised within 
a behavioural rather than a metabolic phenomenal domain [86: 
168]. The two are interdependent in that the range of behaviour 
the agent can generate is dependent on its biology, while its 
biological viability can depend on the behaviour: the recognition 
and escape from threat or the location of food for example. 
While Duijn et al argue that this sensorimotor loop is already 
present in the two component signal transduction system (TCST) 
system found in bacteria, Moreno et al [47] argue that it is the 
central nervous system which fundamentally distinguishes 
biological/metabolic processes from cognitive processes.  
Irrespective of where this line is drawn, both are consistent in 
the view that ‘…cognition is not so much a centralized property 
of the biological hardware of an organism, or a set of internally 
computed algorithms, but instead denotes an abstraction of 
organism environment reciprocity’.[87].  This is consistent with 
the position taken by Varela [50, 82, 88], that autonomous agents 
‘bring forth a world’ as a result of their operational closure. In 
other words, what an agent can perceive and cognize is 
determined by its own operation, not the environment. Again 
from Barandiaran, under conditions of autonomy: ‘It is not the 
organism that matches the environment in a given specified way. 
On the contrary it is through the particular way in which the 
agent satisfies the homeostatic maintenance of essential 
variables that an adaptive environment (a world) is specified - 
cut out from a background of unspecific physical surroundings.’ 
[49] 
What this means is that the environment is a source of 
perturbations which act only as triggers for change. It is the 
nervous system’s structure that dictates which perturbations can 
be a trigger [57, 89].  Consequently changes to the structure of 
one agent’s nervous system, and consequently its behaviour, will 
be unique to that agent.  The environmental perturbations that act 
as a change trigger in one agent will not necessarily trigger a 
change in another, or if they do, the change that is triggered may 
take a different form and/or have different implications for the 
viability of that agent in its environment, given its history of 
interactions.  
The consequence of this recursive construction of increasing 
order of autonomy for the agent is enhanced viability in a wider 
range of environments. This is apparent if we consider the effect 
of the transition from metabolic autonomy (autopoiesis) to 
 sensorimotor autonomy supported by a central nervous system. 
The coexistence of these two interdependent levels of 
autonomous functioning allows the organism to exploit the rapid 
response times of the neural system and this makes possible a 
significantly increased set of possible responses to 
environmental perturbations [49]. An organism that relies less on 
the slow diffusion reactions associated with metabolism, and 
which can draw on the rapid response of the chemical/electrical 
nervous system is better able to survive in less stable 
environments. In systems terms, it has greater requisite variety 
[90].  
It is this asymmetry between the state space of possible 
configurations made possible by an advanced nervous system 
and the range of response needed to maintain immediate 
regulation that gives rise to what we call ‘agency’. Agency is a 
consequence of autonomy. Agency makes possible what we 
typically regard as distinguishing features of social systems: 
endogenous goal making and seeking behaviour. Agency also 
supports ‘free-will’, the opportunity for agents to behave in ways 
which are non-deterministic: to generate new bottom up 
solutions to situations they encounter. From this perspective then 
autonomy is fundamental to agency and hence to a capacity to 
engage in activity which can genuinely be called social. We 
conclude therefore that to be able to simulate an agent which is 
deserving of the title of being a social agent, it would need to 
exhibit some level of ‘strong autonomy’ and hence agency. But 
we are a long way from achieving it.  
Why is this necessary and what does it reveal about the 
fundamental mechanisms at work in social systems? Also, at this 
stage we have considered only agents in isolation. What happens 
when we bring multiple autonomous agents together such that 
they can interact?  
5 MECHANISMS OF SOCIALITY 
Following the line of argument developed above, when 
brought together each agent treats each other agent as a part of 
its environment.  
As agents interact each undergoes a set of internal structural 
accommodations which allow it to persist in its relationship with 
the others. This results in a ‘structural drift’, or a gradual change 
to the state of each agents nervous system [52, 53]. Over time it 
traces a unique history − Maturana refers to this as the agent’s 
ontogeny. When interactions become ‘recurrent’ – that is 
repetitive and ongoing – agents can become ‘structurally 
coupled’.  Here we have the most basic element of sociality and 
one that can be applied to all organisms with nervous systems, 
even very elementary ones.  
Importantly, a history of recurrent interactions leads to a 
structural congruence or commonality of experience between 
two or more agents: their behaviours become tuned to one 
another in a reciprocal ‘dance’ maintained in and through their 
relating.  The degree of structural coupling that arises when two 
or more agents interact is a fundamental factor in determining 
the dynamics and emergent behaviour of the resulting 
structurally coupled system. Agents give rise to a behavioural 
phenomenal domain in which a range of attractors may form. 
These attractors are what we would typically call macro-social 
structures. What then of the advent of language?  
Language is associated with higher order cognition. It will 
support a behavioural domain which is more inherently plastic 
than one coordinated only through bodily interaction. Otherwise, 
as a mechanism, it is an extension of what has already been 
discussed. It is however a non trivial extension as the state space 
of points of interaction becomes very much larger where the 
variables (utterances) are recursive as they are in language as a) 
agents make linguistic distinctions on linguistic distinctions b) 
new linguistic constructs are under control of the system they 
also serve to regulate.  
Structural coupling within a linguistic domain will be apparent 
from the convergence of the individual linguistic utterances to 
form a shared lexicon and grammar. The driving force behind 
this convergence is the one fixed internal goal the agents have: 
that of maintaining their viability. If they are biological agents 
this will involve the preservation of their autopoiesis – i.e. 
remaining alive. At base level this involves meeting the 
requirements of the metabolic level of operation. They will need 
to eat, stay warm, avoid predators and find partners. The 
metabolic or biological necessarily interacts with the behavioural 
and the linguistic domains: the domains are co-dependent. 
The agents will innovate in their behaviour in order to satisfy 
their minimal requirements. Some of the behaviours they adopt 
will, however, be due to a need to accommodate the behaviours 
of other agents. A set of attractors should therefore emerge 
which represent sets of states which ‘satisfice’ social constraints 
as well as fundamental biological constraints. To an observer4 
some of these states may appear as goal based (food seeking) 
while others may be seen to be primarily to do with mutual 
accommodation (norms). The attractors may be reflected in 
macro structuration (division of labour, identity groups) and may 
assemble into yet higher order patterns (organizations, 
institutions). The engine of this process of social emergence is 
structural coupling and the dimensions of possible coupling and 
the scope of behaviours which may be involved in establishing 
and maintaining coupling is dependent on the biology and 
cognitive plasticity of the agent.  
We are currently able to simulate behaviours up to order three. 
Moving beyond this raises some interesting questions. Among 
these are: are the cognitive capabilities clearly associated with 
social behaviour necessarily tied to metabolic autonomy? To 
what degree do these capabilities manifest the way they do due 
to the specific organic mechanisms associated with life? Is it 
possible to simulate behavioural autonomy and linguistic 
systems which are operationally closed on other than an organic 
substrate? If so what are the essential low level characteristics 
which are essential to supporting them?  In short: is it possible to 
model these types of processes in-silico?  
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
There is a range of ways of thinking about the relationship 
between micro and macro level phenomena. There have been 
centuries of debate about the relative merit of reductionist, 
                                                                
4
 The changing role of the observer in distinguishing different 
categories of emergence is a significant issue which has not been taken 
up here. Arguably observer based distinctions play no role in the 
property emergence associated with Ellis’ category one, whilst they are 
intrinsic to the social emergence associated with category five. The role 
in the intermediate categories is less clear. We have set out some early 
thinking about the critical role this plays in 91. Goldspink, C. and R. 
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 vitalist and holistic perspectives for understanding how higher 
order structures emerge from lower. Despite ongoing scepticism 
in some philosophical quarters, we have advanced our 
understanding of the mechanisms involved to a very significant 
degree over the past 30 years. Emergent structures are 
increasingly understood to be a product of non-linear 
interactions associated with complex systems of agents. We can 
however, go further than this. One of the insights being 
developed is that the range and type of emergent structure 
depends on the specific mechanisms involved and on the 
properties of the micro agents.  
This paper has concentrated on how alternative micro-
capabilities support qualitatively distinct forms of social 
emergence. What has been argued is that social emergence 
implies not a single transition from micro to macro but is built 
upon, and is an example of recursive self-organization within a 
biological domain. The recursive levels in living systems span 
metabolic, neurological, social-behavioural and social-semiotic 
levels.   
Social emergence involves a level of self-reference and self 
generation which is not apparent in non-organic forms of far 
from equilibrium behaviour. Social emergence builds on 
biological emergence. This is to say that the phenomenal 
domains associated with social systems, particularly those 
involving humans, are constrained by the biological processes 
which make them possible. The ongoing debate about emergence 
as a concept demonstrates that understanding the relationship 
between micro and macro phenomena is theoretically as well as 
practically challenging. To date it has proven difficult to build 
models which provide reasonable analogues of this process. 
What has been achieved has been achieved largely in robotics, 
and Artificial Life. So far, social simulation has played a minor 
role. Nevertheless the science of these processes is important to 
social simulation. It has proven possible to model some social 
behaviour to good effect without agents with these capabilities. 
It can also be argued that in highly complex (chaotic or random) 
environments higher order cognition is of little value justifying a 
parsimonious substitution of particle-like agents. However, it is 
reasonable to expect that we will not be able to effectively model 
some forms of social behaviour without having come to terms 
with and found ways to simulate behaviour which is possible due 
to autonomous closure. Equally social simulation could play an 
important role in helping us to understand the implications of 
autonomous closure and for advancing our ability to theorise 
about it.   
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